the mission is extended by days. Rationing of the provisions become necessary. Though the humans can make in-
Introduction
life. Questions such as what to ration, when to ration, and the ration distribution fall under the domain of economics. An ad hoc network consists of a multitude of devices that are carried by personnel working towards a common goal.
Economic models make more sense since it is during These devices(nodes) are usually assumed to operate in an times of crisis that the available resources must be conarea without any network infrastructure support, where they sumed in the most economical manner, and at the same communicate with each other (depending on their transmistime, maintain the quality of the network services. Moresion and receiver capacities) and perform the required tasks.
over, in such a distributive network, the notion of "selfThe resource is assigned to the network at the time of deinterested" nodes are introduced to facilitate the design of ployment and usually can not be replenished. It may happen efficient and effective protocols. It is intuitive the selfthat the goals or circumstances change and the resource is interested (or rational) nodes would be focused on maxrationed. An important question to ask is how to administer imizing their "profit" -usually determined by their utilthe efficient management of resources and proper functionity. Nodes adapt their behavior by learning their utility for ing of the ad hoc network.
each potential action through feedback. The feedback is the Let us demonstrate through an example how an unforeprofit or loss as defined by the overall objective function of seen situation might crop up. Consider a scenario where the network. In this way, nodes dynamically react to changin a military mission the personnel are aware of the duraing network conditions, energy budgets, and external stimtion of the mission and thus carry provisions (food, battery, uli. Since all rational nodes seek to optimize their utility, it etc) for that period. However, for any reason whatsoever, makes more sense to program the utilities of the nodes in
In this respect, it is important that concepts from ecoSuch pricing based method can be found in [3] , in which nomic theory are used to guide the design process of the Anderegg and Eidenbenz try to minimize the total price nodes that work in a distributed manner. Our main focus in along the route using a VCG mechanism. To address the this research is to provide an economic resource managecheating issue in pricing, Zhong et al. [18] employ crypment framework for ad hoc networking, especially, routing.
tographic techniques in routing and forwarding. A traffic The main goal of traditional resource management techpricing based approach was proposed in [8] . The compensaniques is to squeeze the best performance out of the systion ofthe traffic forwarding depends not only on the energy tem at all times. Though this has been the rational design consumption of the transmission but also on the congestion choice, it does not suffice for networks that are used in warlevel of the relaying node. fare or emergency services where scarcity of resources is a Selfishness in ad hoc networks is an important issue that common phenomenon.
has been addressed by the research community. Selfish To address the above issues, we propose an economic nodes try to use the resources of the others without particapproach to Hierarchical Routing in Resource Rationed ad ipating in the network functions. In [13] , two techniques hoc networks (HR3). The proposed protocol is based on were presented that deal with selfish nodes in an ad hoc neta hierarchical structure, with various tiers of commander work where a watchdog identifies the misbehaving nodes. nodes. Those commander nodes take charge of a part ofthe Also, there are nodes that rate the routes and help routing network, namely a cluster, and manage the resource within protocols avoid routes containing misbehaving nodes. In the cluster. Nodes in the cluster will make bids to the com-
[5], the authors proposed the "confidant" protocol that not mander for the right to use the resource, and the commanonly detects misbehavior and routes traffic around the misder will grant the winning bids with virtual currency to enbehaving nodes but also isolates them from the network. sure the successful operation on the resources. Rewards are
The "core" protocol proposed in [14] was based on profilgiven to the nodes that cooperate towards the network goal, ing the nodes, i.e., each node maintains a reputation table and the rational nodes take the rewards as stimuli. HR3 not for the other nodes. The reputation value is updated based only works for network with rational nodes, but also takes on the node's own observations and the information procare of situations where malicious nodes exist. HR3 with the second tier commanders. While intra-cluster commeasure the truthfulness of a node in the network [9] . When munication works in an ad hoc manner, inter-cluster comthe destination node successfully receives the data sent by munication must rely on the clusterheads as their gateways.
the source node, it will reward the intermediate nodes that Similarly, the second tier commanders can form their own shown in Figure 1 . The figure shows a sample network with
The output of the price function P is in terms of virtual 3 levels. The advantage of this kind ofhierarchical structure currency. Wpq (t) is calculated by node q and indicates the is twofold. First, the management of the nodes (i.e., authoramount of virtual currency it would cost node p to commuity distribution) within each cluster is easy since they all nication between them. However, the price node q passes belong to the same tier and enjoy equal privileges. Second, to node p may not be the same as Wpq(t) because nodes the hierarchical structure is scalable -adding and removing act as selfish agents. The purpose of the function P is nodes from the network will not cause much change to the to price/value the service (i.e., forwarding data) differently structure.
based on the distribution of resource among the nodes, and center commandr _such pricing denies any QoS violation. More precisely, P lar centralized control ideas can be also found in [3] , [17] .
For every node in the network, if it acts as the source Third, the number of winning bids may be more than one;
node and wants to send data to the destination node that is based on the evaluation of the bidding tuples, the commannot directly reachable, then the source node has to rely on ders could enable several data sessions simultaneously, as other nodes -thereby using the network resources This bidding process of this tier follows the same manner as intra-cluster bidding we described above, and this process is 0 repeated until the bids reach the center commander.
The center commander evaluates all the bids submitted 100 rsidual energy by the first tier commanders and choose a number of winseparation distance ning bids. The center commander will pay a premium to the winning soldier through the route by which the bid is Figure 2 . A sample realization of W.
submitted. The cost for forwarding is also made zero (free). three characteristics. First, it is synchronized, i.e., every When the soldier gets the premium, he will begin to send the node that wishes to bid, submit their bid within a given time data packets through the route he computed. Packet Purse Model [6] is used to pay the nodes along the route. The price function, nodes with low credit reputation will not be nodes take their payment and forward the data packet with excluded to increase their reputation permanently. the remaining premium to next hop nodes.The destination node upon receiving the data, will issue reputation credits to DEFINITION the nodes using their dominant strategies, no node can get Recall that the price function P determines the price of more profits by unilaterally altering the strategy, which is wpq(t) based the resource parameters, including the repupopularly known as the Nash Equilibrium.
C tation credits, node q has. Reputation credits are gained From the above Lemmas provided so far, we infer that only through participation in data forwarding. Since higher HR3 is truthful with rational nodes. reputation credit for a node results in lower price which We analyze HR3 if not all the nodes are rational. As means more probability of being chosen for routing, which a matter of fact, irrational node behavior occurs in a miliin return will help node q gain more reputation credits. On tary selling when some node is captured and released back the contrary, the low credit reputation will prevent the node to the network with malicious intent. Such events will from participating in the the relay, and hamper further accuhamper proper communication among nodes, i.e., transmismulation of credits. It is noted that with other inputs of the sion/reception ofpackets. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the malicious node will not change the content of the towards the source would not be able to report the signadata packet as a kind of destructive behavior. The presence ture. We assume that there is a secure path for all the nodes of malicious nodes brings forth challenges in network deto report to the clusterhead, and thus we can always locate sign. One of the important tasks is to discover misbehaving the malicious node within a minimum clique of two nodes. node and isolate them so as to minimize their adverse effect.
The locating phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5 . The irrationality can be generally classified in three
The malicious node is labeled as B, and it drops the credit ways-disabled, intentional packet droppings, and making packet which is supposed to be sent to node C. If B reports false bids.
the signature, while C is not able to, the minimum clique * Disabled. This happens when some nodes (personnel) is (B, C). If B decides to cheat (either not report or misare captured and can no longer be part of the network. In report) and pretends it does not receive the credits, then this situation, the network will nevertheless lose a node. If the minimum clique is (A, B) . If we can find another route this node is a soldier node, the network can still operate with which B is on, by the same method, we can put B in another the rest of the structure unchanged, however, if this node is minimum clique. Therefore, the malicious node is discova commander node, then a new commander is needed to reered. However, this method does cause some false alarms, place the disabled one. Recall, the bidding process in HR3 nevertheless, the probability of finding the malicious node is synchronized and if a clusterhead does not exchange beais always greater.
con signals (i.e., bids) from one of its cluster member nodes, it signifies that a node is disabled. Similarly, since the dis-/ abled node also acts as a clusterhead, if the member nodes / l / in that cluster get no bidding replies, that disabled cluster--/ / head can be identified.
- 
Proof
To define the strategy adopted by the maintentionally dropped, it can trace the malicious node (node licious node, we assume it reports the signature cor-C in Figure 4( Figure 4 . Intentional packet droppings to query with arbitrary prices, a malicious node can make In the reputation credit packet sent by the destination false bids with unreasonable prices. Bidding a high price is node, a signature cryptogram is added, which can only be not necessary since that reduces the chance that the bid will decrypted by the private key of the intended node itself.
win. A malicious node can only be destructive if it is on a When receiving the credits, the clusterhead requires to reroute. To this end, a malicious node will not try to bid at a port this signature. If the malicious node drops the credit higher price than the reserve price. However, it can bid at a packet with the remaining credits, then the next hop nodes lower price; in this way if this bid is a winning one, the total budget requested from the commander will not be enough First, we are interested in how the bidding and reputathe bidding tuples reach the commander, the commander tion credits are managed. We observe how the reputation will grant 5 sessions with least total energy consumption.
credits for rational and malicious nodes change in Figure  It is worth mentioning that the price function and the crite-6. The reputation credits for rational nodes keep increasria for selecting the winning bids used in the simulation is ing, but with different rates. The malicious node is not set for demonstration purpose only. The price function should to be malicious at the beginning, because we believe a ramatch the goal for resource rationing and the criteria for tional node turns malicious because of some external reaselecting the winning bids should be based on the comsons (e.g., captured). In the simulation, certain number of mander's evaluation of the bids, which involves the actual nodes become malicious at 200 seconds. Before they turn amount of information contained, to be malicious, their credits keep increasing, however, after The bidding process is triggered every 5 seconds, which 200 seconds, their credits stop increasing, because they are means that every 5 seconds new pairs of source and destifound to be malicious. The credits plots indicate that our nation nodes are chosen. The data flow for the sessions are HR3 is truthful.
